# Emory KR Round 1 Wiki Doc

## 1NC

### Topicality---1NC

#### “No-first-use” policy must be universal---it eliminates all instances of response to non-nuclear attacks.

Péczeli 17

n f u policy would mean the U S would only use nuclear weapons in response to a nuclear attack By definition, it would rule out the use of nuc s against all non-nuclear states conventional or CBW attacks

#### They violate---the plan leaves open first use in non-China instances.

#### Vote NEG for predictable limits and ground---there are definitionally infinite subsets for an NFU policy and the only way for the NEG to have viable offense is in-depth research in a hyper-specific area of scholarship.

### Politics---1NC

#### Child tax credit extension passes now, but Biden’s PC is key.

Phillips 1-19

The White House urging Congress to pass a bipartisan tax bill expand the child tax credit teeing up for a full House vote that at the end of the month. House advanced a bipartisan bill the President will continue the fight restore the Child Tax Credit the bipartisan bill is a welcome step forward, and Congress should pass it in an election year the deal could offer wins that both parties could take home to voters.

#### Nuclear posture changes tank Biden’s PC.

Collina 21

Biden review American nuclear policy efforts indicate Biden wants arms control Biden’s success will depend on how much p c he can spend bomb is deeply embedded Changing takes leadership focused, sustained attention over years

#### CTC reverses the aging crisis.

Bindner 19

largest problem aging population only solution is a decent income through tax benefits an explicit subsidy for family size overcomes this market failure, leading to a reverse of the aging crisis a child tax credit take away the disincentive to have kids more workers attain levels of productivity large enough to reverse the demographic time bomb

#### Extinction.

Vladev 20

demographic s a factor for existence of civilization are wide and create hazards for society leading the problems of our time influence peace international security health and education resources for societies Decreasing due to aging and shortage of labour cause social problems demographic bombs affect water, food, energy, raw materials as well as environment and climate resolving problem s of future gen s

### Assurances---1NC

#### The plan prompts allied prolif and wrecks alliances.

Payne and Dodge 23

a questionnaire to allies asking them about NFU responses were overwhelmingly negative from the U K France Germany Japan and Australia governments opposed U.S. initiatives Taiwan Japan South Korea and even Australia have toyed with their own nuclear weapons they will do so again Washington ultimately did not may be seen as deference to allied concerns allies strongly oppose them as detrimental to deterrence anti-nuclear initiatives source of the U.S-Allied incongruence but it is an avoidable cause assurance contribute to viability of the U.S. alliance structure alternative contributes to strains

#### That’s key to stave off pandemics, climate change, trade wars, econ collapse.

Tatsumi & Kennedy 22

U.S.-Japan alliance meet challenges of a pandemic climate trade econ liberal international norms been a cornerstone in the Indo-Pacific focus on defense pandemic and climate change human rights, and coop with other allies maritime security of oceans and critical sea lanes has global implications for norms development spurred by the U S and Japan emerging dimensions especially economic security supply chains trade and investment there is a need for the alliance The alliance facilitate cooperation not only between the two allies but also with other partners

### JCS CP---1NC

#### The Joint Chiefs of Staff ought to recommend that the United States forbid nuclear first use towards the People’s Republic of China.

#### The president defers to the JCS’ recommendations---it’s politically costly to oppose recommendations and other branches are hollowed out.

Friend and Weiner 22

civilian leaders defer to military expertise Obama and Trump deferred the military has a monopoly on expertise civilian leaders eventually adopted the military’s policy preferences even though in direct opposition to those initially expressed by the president it is politically challenging to oppose military advice and politically beneficial to align with military opinion political sway is the most likely explanation for civilian deference

#### Recommendations key to a healthy hybrid model that preserves warfighting.

Chavez and Gannon 23

Critics contend the military will forget war is an instrument of policy What about the civilians Domestic constraints can be more influential in military strategy With a full menu , commanders in consultation with civilian principals can optimally contour force exec shield the median voter by fielding tech over troops leaders can truncate to only high-tech approaches civilians can limit options to high-tech approaches that are not always conducive to victory threat spectrum remains broad and diverse political-military mismatch will challenge modern warfighting Solutions lie in problem identification healthy hybrid model Commanders ought enrich civilian decision-makers

#### That solves existential threats.

Lee and Manguiles 23

New tech emerging domains rapidly changing info environment domestic groups undermine democratic processes challenges demand c m r actors threats vulnerabilities grow Cyber threaten military targets but also civilian infrastructure intellectual property Space assets a sat enable GPS used by both military and civilians the global banking and investment threats to democratic processes require coordination

### Advantage CP---1NC

#### The United States should

#### Adopt a decide-under-attack posture,

#### Take its silo-based missiles off high-alert,

#### Initiate strategic stability talks with China,

#### Remove deployed ballistic missile defense systems in East Asia,

#### Publicly acknowledge that China’s nuclear arsenal is survivable,

#### Offer inducements to India and Pakistan for restraining nuclear modernization.

#### Solves crisis stability.

Wright et al 16

U S nuc s on high alert increase chance of accidental, unauthorized, or mistaken launch Chinese begun to argue nuc s on alert U.S. decision influence China to refrain U S should remove options for launch on warning and take silo-based missiles off alert U S would maintain robust deterrent

### Cosmo K---1NC

#### The 1AC’s competitive-state model reinforces taken-for-granted nationalism---it makes answering transnational questions impossible.

Kettunen 21

competitiveness security nationalism appear as rational and taken-for-granted mode of thought Taken-for-granted nationalism reinforced by competitiveness and security the nation-state provides a readymade framework for xenophobic nationalism the us-other distinction into an exclusionary divide and the internal-external into borders the national “us” may facilitate populist s social divides with competitive community A non-divisive understanding would require a transnational dimension

#### Vote negative to challenge the Westphalian frame.

#### Taken-for-granted nationalism is up for contestation and determines the scope of justice ---the “who” of politics predetermines the “what” of policy.

Fraser 05

Globalization is changing justice disputes presumed a ‘ Westphalian frame’ within states about citizens a Westphalian imaginary distinguished ‘domestic’ from ‘international’ through mass media and cybertech global warming aids terrorism and unilateralism trespass borders the Westphalian frame ceased to be axiomatic transnational corporations escape regulatory powers transnational coalitions are cosmopolitan exploding the Westphalian frame the grammar of argument has altered question of what

### Filibuster CP---1NC

#### President Biden should initiate a public campaign for, and the United States House of Representative should pass legislation forbids nuclear first use towards the People’s Republic of China. The United States Senate should filibuster that legislation. The Supreme Court should rule that the Senate’s failure to allow a vote on that legislation is unconstitutional.

#### The CP ends the largest proximate cause of legislative dysfunction.

Fredrickson 20

democracy is on shakier ground system does not function well many avenues for delaying legislation On this agenda are initiatives that need to pass Congress Senate deliberative has become dysfunctional filibuster has made the Senate a graveyard of ideas Without abolition democracy will not move into action

#### That’s key to solve a host of existential risks. Independently turns the case by ruining the plans signal.

Feaver 20

Putinism Afghanistan Iran terrorists climate pandemics refugee crisis becomes more difficult to confront if the country is ripped apart by political divisiveness as if the gravest threat came from the other party Domestic politics is national security and vice-versa Restoring democracy is a thorny problem biggest impact including compromises domestic problems constrain America’s geopolitical position dysfunction can hobble government freezes the engine of foreign policy complete collapse of the legislative process dysfunction at home feeds political dysfunction in allies, partners adversaries authoritarianism populism can all be seen

### Cooperation Advantage---1NC

#### ­We’ll concede the aff causes North Korea to give up their nukes. That’s bad---it causes the US to attempt regime change.

Sukin 23

Biden’s Strategy states Kim regime was brutal you will see a regime like this collapse that’s something we are looking to accelerate The U S could agree to a deal that removed the North Korean nuclear program the U S would be unable to commit to that promise It would have incentive to take advantage of diminished No Ko capabilities to impose regime change on Pyongyang

#### That causes unconventional attacks.

Miller 17 Regime Change in North Korea Decapitation would increase the risk of use of biological or chemical weapons military units could exploit breakdown of state authority to pilfer NBC weapons units in control of these weapons, assuming the U S were behind the attack could retaliate triggering a larger-scale conflict that would engulf the peninsula.

#### Extinction.

Miller 16

countries like North Korea will unleash a BVP A worse threat is North Korea bioengineering a virus there will be no immunity or treatment if a state were to task a small lab to develop a GMO with high lethality, high transmissibility, and latency period this state could destroy generate a collapse and destroys the nation’s strength an “existential threat wiping out civilization as we know it.

#### Modernization is stabilizing. Neither the US or North Korea will risk even conventional conflict.

D’Ambruoso 23

U.S.-North Korean relations are example of deterrence missile tests observers fear we could be heading toward dangerous days a closer look makes it unsurprising neither side favored war North Koreans have focused rhetorical arrows North Korea has said less about American response it has said enormous casualties were likely bolsters the idea North Korea would prefer any other outcome to nuclear war U.S. officials admitted North Korea has enough firepower to ensure war is not worth the price North Korea can deliver damage the U S would find unacceptable

#### Fissile shortages put a hard cap on their arsenal size.

Wit 23

the size of North Korea’s arsenal is limited by the amount of fuel plutonium only a tiny inventory It doesn’t have that capacity now it takes a long time to develop new capabilities in nuclear reactors The only operating reactor is the small 5 MWe Reactor it can, at best, produce six kilograms per year

#### Their plans are nowhere close to being operational

News4 23

North Korea showcased i c b m s at a armed service parade the presence of potentially reliable-fueled missiles does not imply they are workable North Korea is not considered to have flight analyzed a sound-fueled missile it faces numerous technical hurdles to deploy just one.

#### No NFU credibility. Lack of durability means no one would believe an NFU. It would undermine crisis-stability and ensure allied prolif.

Maurer 22

n f u not the “quick fix proponents claim policy would not solve crisis-stability Adversaries are unlikely to be reassured by a verbal promise that could be reversed at any time. partners see reduction in commitment which drive them to seek independent nuclear forces shifting during the worst security crisis would be a terrible idea,

### China Advantage---1NC

#### NFU emboldens China to invade Taiwan.

Mazza 21

The risk of nuclear escalation acts as an inhibitor for adversaries China may opt for aggression an American NFU could weaken Washington’s ability to deter China from Taiwan China may see less reason for caution in striking US bases An NFU policy would deny credible nuclear signaling

#### Invasion ensures a totalitarian world order.

Easton 23

seizing Taiwan PRC sphere of influence breaking) the American alliance system Nuclear arms racing spiral out of control Japan South Korea likely go nuclear save their nation from takeover independent deterrent force North Korea emboldened by Chinese invasion takeover of the peninsula coercion escalate to war in Europe United States humiliated by China democracies would fray fracture the NATO alliance cascading waves of political violence European countries overtaken by populist impulses CCP would rapidly spread totalitarian governance network of proxy governments fundamentally transform the world order

#### Totalitarian governance causes extinction.

Belfield 23

totalitarian states risk extinction bad at dealing with disasters makes extinction likely, by raising the chance of w m d s totalitarian s are less cooperative lack of transparency limits agreements bad for pandemics climate change inequality offensive power AI or biotech We should be concerned about locking-in future tech such as a g i space settlement or surveillance A totalitarian-dominated world order totalitarian world extend risk of extinction, as well as distortion of the human trajectory which threaten destruction of humanity’s potential

#### The thesis of entanglement is false and the AFF can’t solve.

Snyder & Blanc 23.

entanglement gained currency found no evidence decisions based on concerns about inadvertent escalation stemming from entanglement record contradicts dedicated systems for mitigating escalation commingling of nuclear and conventional is inevitable radars cannot distinguish Even if command and control systems could be perfectly disentangled it would not guarantee avoidance

#### They don’t have operational plans to escalate based on entangled systems.

Kroenig & Massa 21.

entanglement theorists maintain strikes could cause Beijing to choose nuclear escalation there are reasons to doubt Beijing maintains no first use China does not design force for first use operational units are not assigned warheads not much evidence Beijing plans for preemptive strikes the risks would be immense large-scale nuclear exchange would be unattractive They would avoid this outcome Beijing would have other options prevent a possible US disarming strike

#### No scenario for Chinese escalation.

Wu 22

study examined use-it-or-lose-it accidental, the risk is extremely low nuclear forces are survivable NC3 system is highly centralized biased toward negative control it has adopted constraints to prevent accidental launches catastrophic consequences cause the U S to exercise extreme caution before damage-limitation debates overemphasized nuclear-conventional entanglement states can separate stability-instability paradox is “tremendously misleading The risk of escalation can be a strong deterrent attitudes can contribute to reducing the risk nuclear taboo plays an important role escalation is unthinkable

#### ICBMs are secure now and there’s no chance of accidental launch, BUT the option to launch is critical to deterrence.

Geller 21

claim that ICBMs, are on “hair trigger alert” military leaders discredited that falsehood commander of U.S. Strategic Command has made clear hair trigger is “not a thing ICBMs are responsive does not equate to accidental launch means that adversaries know U S can respond attack would occur within tensions or conventional conflict making false alarm improbable To boost deterrence U S does retain option to launch adversaries with large arsenals cannot destroy U.S. ICBMs because the President has option of launching multitude of safeguards make accidental or unauthorized ICBM launch impossible ICBM is not like a loaded gun Nor is there a “big red button Given safeguards required to launch ICBMs critical role in deterring large scale attack it’s past time to retire claim of “hair trigger alert

#### The risk of accidental war defies all logic and evidence.

Quackenbush 23

There is a divide between accidental war in models and lit central is that something inadvertent results in war purely by chance, without choice No war occurred in this manner, so no cases correspond in stark contrast to discussions This adds the leader’s choice no war is accidental mistaken warning seems to be about incomplete info The only way for monitoring to affect likelihood is making info complete Info can affect the likelihood leaders choose war, but will not affect war from chance Incomplete info is already accounted for both logic and evidence contradict accidental war scholars want to believe the military can cause war

### Modernization Advantage---1NC

#### Tons of alt causes swamp solvency.

Kim 21

lack of trust pose challenge to stability between U S and China US considers China revisionist Chinese elites mistrust Washington According to China the U S provoked competition by push ing for nuclear space, cyber and missile defense Chinese are concerned that U S is working to negate China’s “minimal deterrent” by modernizing US nuclear forces and bolstering defensive capabilities, including satellite forward-based radars, and b m d in addition to non-nuclear strike capabilities

#### Chinese nuclear modernization isn’t destabilizing. It strengthens MAD rather than weakening it.

Talmadge Rovner 23.

experts reacted to China’s nuclear changes with skepticism they amount to a fundamental shift in strategic intentions nuclear stalemate is stabilizing reducing likelihood of war an opponent bolstering should not be cause for alarm may not reflect a change in the basic role the to nuclear forces China could retain n f u China's modernization bolters deterrence it does not portend increased risk-taking the U S does not have make changes to its declaratory posture it is virtually impossible to escape MAD China’s modernization is about second strike not a threat secure forces should tamp down the risk of conflict Deterrence does not require tinkering

#### No chance of Sino-Indo-Pak war.

Singh 20

contrary to fears Sino-Indian war is unlikely because of nature and lack of ideological fundamentalism India’s strat is autonomy risks of pre-emption are not high because of agreements for diplomatic engagement effective during the 16-day stand-off Burtse and Doklam Summit diplomacy is likely if crisis escalates ability of both to control media, and inscrutability aided efforts to manage audience costs both claim tactical victories and diffuse successfully material costs far outweigh gains. For China, conflict diminish ability to meet challenges in S C S making it vulnerable to its primary competitor rep damage due to COVID fears and India’s capabilities temper force for India primary remains Pakistan land do not hold resources benefits are therefore, limited

## 2NC

### China Advantage---2NC

#### 1. Magnitude and Timeframe---goes nuclear quickly.

Wasser 22

A war game demonstrated how quickly a conflict could escalate China’s modernization mean that, in the real world, a fight could go nuclear. leaders may not accept failure the CCP might take significant risks from Beijing’s perspective nuclear weapons may be the most effective means to keep the United States out

#### 2. Externally, invasion sets off a series of existential crises:

#### Europe. Invasion would collapse NATO.

1. <<FOR REFERENCE>> in Europe United States humiliated by China democracies of Europe would fray fracture the NATO alliance

#### Extinction.

Gallagher & Dueck 19

America’s alliance provides U.S. comparative advantages with regard to Beijing Moscow terrorism cyberattacks nuc weapons and military readiness NATO is the one formal alliance that allows for coop NATO keeps competitors at bay, pushing back on Russian and Chinese influence like oxygen you’ll miss it when it’s gone.

#### Populism. Invasion spurs cyclical waves of it.

FOR REFERENCE cascading waves of political violence European countries overtaken by populist impulses CCP would rapidly spread totalitarian governance network of proxy governments fundamentally transform the world order

#### Extinction.

Leigh 21

the biggest risks such as next virus combine infectiousness with deadliness extremists developing versions of plague climate change rendering the planet uninhabitable nuclear catastrophe superintelligence could spell disaster unknown unknowns could be lurking tackling ex risks is a political problem rise of populists is crucial to humanity’s survival populists tend to be uninterested in long-term threats focus on the short term missing the threats that could kill us Bad politics doesn’t just exacerbate other dangers a risk factor in itself

#### 1. All actors are deterred now from escalating AND risk reduction is possible despite modernization.

d’Ambruoso 23

**[Figure omitted]**

nuclear age is age of restraint states are reluctant to go to war for fear of consequences tech innovations have not changed leaders’ risk calculus Threats chance deter without acting China warheads silos, and delivery sound scary, but China trying to deter a rival that has more nuclear options strategic ambiguity has served the U S well in keeping Taiwan safe Arms control has been a tougher sell mutual vulnerability will persist no matter who has an edge

#### 2. Crisis stability is wrong---Taiwan is the only scenario for escalation.

Krulak & Friedman 21

A war between US and China no inevitable any conflict would turn nuclear Taiwan could become this century’s tripwire conflict would certainly take the form of proxy war China will not match the US for decades head-to-head conflict would be too dangerous we should give less weight to any scenario in which Chinese consciously precipitate confrontation

#### 3. Deterrence is strong and works now.

Garamone 23

Defense Departmen working to strengthen deterrence across the Taiwan Strait admin opposes any unilateral changes leaders have yet to renounce the use of military force while they turn to revisionist aims conflict would be devastating Military aggression in the form of an invasion a blockade or other means would risk human life

#### 4. New low yield options have removed ‘any doubt’ that it succeeds.

Miller ’19

weakness in deterrent relates to escalate to de-escalate To remove any doubt D o D moved to deploy low-yield option and dispel misperceptions about will and capability warhead attacked on suggestion weapon is designed to mak war-fighting possibility. This flies in the face of policy Expanding flexible options is important for deterrence raise nuclear threshold ensure adversaries perceive no advantage in limited escalation, making nuc less likely

**5. Even if there’s some instability, deterrence is holding for worst-case scenarios.**

**Edelman ’22**

If you think world is dangerous **now** **envision** it **without** a **reliable** **nuclear deterrent** effective **nuclear force** deters **not only** **conventional aggression** against **NATO** and **Pacific**. Would Putin **attack** **Ukraine** if Kyiv had **nucl** **?** Would he be striking **NATO** if **nuclear umbrella** was not in place**?** Would we **resupply** Ukraine without **nuc** deterrent**?** questions **answer themselves** **Now more than ever** we should be **clear** **nuclear deterrent** **many roles** **deterring** **non-nuclear** attack is **vital**

#### 2. Investments solve---that’s D’Ambruso AND…

Garamone 23

fficials do not believe conflict is inevitable this is because deterrence works Deterrence is strong and we are doing more to keep it that way Our budget request shows cutting-edge capabilities maintain deterrence well into the future

#### 3. Plan can’t solve. Fear of arsenal survivability cannot explain the rate at which China is building up arms.

Cunningham 23.

concerns China’s retaliatory capability have not increased so dramatically as to offer a explanation for unprecedented nuclear modernization Although U.S. damage limitation was thin in 2016 Chinese experts did not believe that capability gave Washington coercive leverage They were confident the damage China could inflict as sufficient There is little evidence linking DF-26 to retaliation

#### 1. NFU emboldens Chinese aggression in Taiwan by inspiring confidence in conventional conflict.

Geller 21

NFU would assure no risk of nuclear attack more certainty adversaries have about U.S. plans to use nuclear force the easier they can plan aggression to remain below Adversaries become emboldened to use conventional forces against early warning command-and-control assets China become emboldened to overtake Taiwan Nuclear forces deter war more effectively than conventional forces

#### 2. The AFF deletes the US’s only option for preventing Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Conventional capabilities are irrelevant to China’s confidence.

Thornton 21

Chinese ideas about escalation Applied to Taiwan are not sanguine China's theater advantage is biased towards short-term conflicts the U S would need time to assemble conventional forces unclear how Chinese NFU applies to internal conflict unlikelihood of conventional conflict decreased if originates between a third party not like proxy wars fundamental geopolitical contest : Taiwan Taiwan's fate could be ground of opposition to Chinese revisionism NFU would preclude leverage to temper instability diminished relevance of US conventional superiority merits retention of declaratory policy that reserves nuclear escalation to deter revisionism Chinese confidence could inaugurate escalatory cycle best option is to prevent that confidence

#### 2. Nuclear deterrence is a prerequisite to credible conventional forces.

Frühling & O’Neil 22

US views on escalation become relevant in assessing the credibility of conventional deterrence for alliances, US need to focus on the importance of damage-limitation capabilities If the US wishes to avoid questions about extended-deterrence and alliances it must be willing to risk a nuclear exchange if the US is to fight a conventional war it has to address the vulnerability of conventional forces to nuclear attack and understand nuclear deterrence influences the strategic credibility of its conventional forces

#### 3. The US cannot win a conventional war. Only the threat of first use is sufficient.

Kroenig 21

The U S might need to use nuclear weapons first U S has retained the option in declaratory policy event of invasion the U S lacks conventional firepower If the U S were willing to use nuc s the U S could certainly prevent Chinese invasion this threats of nuclear use The purpose would be to mak clear to the PLA it cannot fight through US nuclear onslaught to take Taiwan

#### 4. Conventional forces fail.

White 21

US superiority is a myth conventional forces have ‘global reach’ But cannot deploy enough force to distant battlefields to defeat a major power Washington can no longer win a conventional war against China Washington could only hope to threaten nuclear attack

#### 5. Conventional deterrent is insufficient. Putting maximal pressure, including first-use, is key to prevent Taiwan invasion.

Pry 21

China has no qualms making military threats to conquer Taiwan constrained for decades only because of fear of U.S. intervention China attempts Taiwan the U.S. will be militarily disadvantaged wargames show the U.S. losing to China Given the proximity of nuclear confrontation over Taiwan N F U risk sending the wrong message at a perilous time What is needed is nuclear deterrent second to none nuclear inferiority will be tantamount to surrender in the New Cold War.

#### No conventional-nuclear colocation.

Wu 22

entanglement of nuclear and conventional does not mean colocated There is no evidence that China colocates its missiles and the Chinese military has never implied survivability is a priority Colocating would reduce the survivability strategists also argue dual-use here is no evidence to support this

#### No China accidental use.

Wu 22

tech constraints and doctrinal restraints the risk of accidental launch seems to be extremely low China prioritizes negative control nuc s will never be used without an authorized order NC3 is highly centralized pre-delegation is hard to imagine commanders are required to reestablish communication China is currently unable to adopt LOW

#### No first use is hardened in Chinese policy---zero risk of shift.

Wu 22

China maintains no first use Chinese participants maintain ambiguity theoretically it could use first in reality probability is close to zero China’s vast geography and large population make it unlikely it is politically and militarily unwise mutual restraint is important

#### Nuclear-conventional entanglement is stabilizing.

Kroenig & Massa 21.

entanglement suggests entanglement is inherently destabilizing If one takes entanglement seriously there are reasons to believe dual-use capabilities might strengthen strategic stability reduces firststrike incentives NC3 might be more likely to deescalate the crisis theories suggest dual-use capabilities might render nuclear escalation less likely voluntarily refrain from targets to avoid escalatory risks

#### Use-it or lose-it is wrong.

Wu 22

The military is unlikely to destroy China’s retaliatory capability this would reduce the risk of use-it-or-lose-it the risk is zero two factors can mitigate China’s national command would likely maintain minimum communication capability with nuclear forces NC3 does not require prompt retaliation

#### Endless safeguards and check the risk of accidental conflict.

Heinrichs 20

“hair trigger alert.” is an erroneous characterization alert postures are highly stable subject to multiple layers of control, ensuring presidential decision-making The U S fields sensors to provide warning satellites to detect plumes and other assets enemy launch would occur within a context of tensions this hypothetical nightmare scenario where we have a believable warning that is a false alarm is highly unlikely

#### Wars are started by choice not accident---their scenarios conflate tactical with strategic miscalculation

Brands 20

war won’t start by accident. The accidental war thesis was raised accidental collision between ships in the S C S It is hard to identify wars that came about even though no one wanted them The reality is that countries tend to avoid war there is no monumental decision than to initiate a conflict when countries do want to avert showdown, they are willing to tack or retreat, even at cost of embarrassment There were near misses Accidental war seems unlikely today U.S. and Chinese policymakers know a war could very well become If both sides truly seek to avoid one Conflict occur when one party decides that war is preferable to the status quo

### Modernization Advantage---2NC

#### The perception of conventional counterforce alone is enough to trigger Chinese insecurity fears.

Bowers 22

long-range hyper accurate precision capabilities could form part of a conventional counterforce capability Now conven-tional weapons can pose a potent threat to nuclear weapons systems precision strike and m d enabled conventional counterforce what matters are the opposition’s perception of this capability and how that opposition responds to it

#### Fears of conventional capabilities, not nuclear use, drives Chinse concerns over damage limitation strikes.

Charap et al 22

improvements in missile accuracy increased the US ability to destroy fixed targets and b m d continued to lower the costs of Chinese nuclear attack’ observers identified m d a complicating factor in nuclear reductions m d in combination with increasingly accurate long-range weapons and other counterforce capabilities contributed to arms racing

### Topicality---2NC

#### 1. Adopt applies to ALL.

Kelly 16

misleading to use adopt" as applied to rules. We consider rules appropriate for the present case without holding they apply to all situations

#### 2. “Policy” applies generally rather than to singular subsets.

McIntyre 15

policy definite course plain reading must apply generally to a class, rather than one of many policy suggests widespread application commonly understood meaning

#### 3. “Restrictions” cannot have “conditions”.

Pashman 63

question is whether provision is restriction Kilkenny held that this was condition restriction cannot be synonymous with condition

#### Counter-interp is bad. Takahara is not qualified and a botched translation. Here’s what their authors are actually defining:

Suzuki et. al. 20

(NFU The policy not to use nuclear weapons earlier than the opponent in an armed conflict China has been consistently declaring NFU, stating that China will not be the first under any circumstance.

#### That means they don’t meet---“the” is a definite article---“an opponent” explodes limits to CBWs, cyber, terror, and a litany of other NFU carveouts.

BC n.d.

the definite article say something about all the things referred to The wolf is not dangerous (= Wolves are not dangerous

## 1NR

### Topicality---1NR

#### No de-facto NFU against non-nuclear states---they want more.

Khan 23

most non-nuclear states continue advocating for legally binding NSAs These states the security assurances currently offered to them as insufficient, fragmented unilateral declarations by nuclear states are full of qualifiers and caveats

### Cooperation Advantage---1NR

#### Probability.

Broad 19

North Korea is far more likely to use biological weapons than nuclear ones said Weber, a Pentagon official in charge of biological defense programs The program is advanced, underestimated and lethal

#### Magnitude.

Singer 1

There was a small chance dust would cause nuclear winter results of over a hundred tests are barely detectable even a full scale exchange would be modest compared to background radiation pose a more serious threat to human survival biological warfare global immunity to smallpox will be at a low while the opportunity to spread at an all time high coat protein variants render vaccination ineffective engineered for greater virulence and mortality survival may be in question

#### China would defend North Korea. That causes quick US-China war And, China would seize the opportunity to invade Taiwan.

Mastro 22

war on Korean Peninsula prove devastating Japan’s personnel would be deployed to Korea China use a North Korea–spurred crisis to invade Taiwan China plans to send ground forces into the North crisis a golden opportunity may make it possible to defeat Taipei With assets in Korea a Chinese amphibious force might be able to move on the island without advanced warning war’s eventual outcome would be a fait accompli.

#### Biological attacks cause US nuclear draw in.

O’Hanlon 16

If a biological attack were successfully conducted it is implausible that the U S would eschew retaliatory measures a nuclear strike could be carried out with greater precision lending credibility to likelihood it would be conducted

#### The US wouldn’t think twice. They’re obsessed with regime change.

Roy 23

nuclear weapons preserv peace by making war dangerous Many analysts subscribe to this view. North Korean nuc s better than without the Korean Peninsula is more peaceful the U S is obsessed with regime change, would like nothing more than to effect regime change The US and ROK are deterred nuclear arsenals compel peace and stability

#### North Korean nukes are good---without them, the US would attempt regime change.

Bandow 20

the D P R K remains a modest nuclear power, with This arsenal offers a deterrent but far short of a serious offensive weapon  after the Cold War Washington took advantage of its position to defenestrate governments at will the only sure way to prevent an attack by nations with conventional advantage is with nuclear weapons U.S. policymakers have plotted to strike now to preserve the United States’ ability to strike it later. As long as North Korea possessed only conventional weapons Washington go on to liberate the N The North’s arsenal ensures the regime’s survival it removes any possibility of Washington launching a preventive war The United States’ ruthless approach to regimes on Washington’s naughty list highlights vulnerability of any government without nukes What is to prevent Trump from changing the terms once Kim has yielded nukes?

#### The US would attempt regime change without nuclear weapons.

Bandow 23

Kim strike would result in annihilation a North Korean nuclear program is the result of regime change After Iraq, Libya, and Syria, Kim would be a fool if he did not create and keep a sizable nuclear arsenal

#### Nukes don’t escalate, but they do ensure regime stability.

James 21

bona-fide nuclear deterrent guarantor of safety America’s reneging on agreements with Iran and assisting regime change in countries lacking nuc s Iraq Afghanistan Libya in addition to leadership to change every four years Pyongyang is unlikely to use weapons do not pose an credible national security risk

#### Bioweapon use outweighs nuke war. Pathogen releasers have no control.

McQuilling 23

While nukes are awful, there are weapons arguably worse less controllable, and could wipe out all of humanity Bio weapons use is illegal for good reason They can devastate civilian populations and side releasing has no control over the weapon diseases could be tweaked and turned into devastating bioweapons A nuc can wipe out a city a microscopic virus could take out most of the planet

#### It’s try-or-die for the turn. Korea will never use the weapons offensively, but they’re a tactic of quelling dissent.

Lee 19

North Korea nuclear is unproven Kim opts for the second best option the mere threat invigorate the populace officials convinced of the Leader's decisiveness Kim able to secure his seat convince people they are the most powerful nations international attention reinforce this if North Korea agrees to abandon nuclear development it is likely to be seen as weakness increase dissent lead to a destabilization of the regime .

#### Regime collapses destabilizes all of Northeast Asia. Independently causes CBW use.

Shaquille 23

there are reasons to be deeply concerned about state collapse scarcity economic stagnation food insecurity COVID-19 a collapse in the country could trigger mass refugee flows and widespread starvation. the fourth largest military faces food security issues breakdown of command, control, pose security challenges to stabilize loss of C2 concerning their chemical, and biological weapons pose a WMD threat to the entire region

#### The risk of miscalculation or first strike is incredibly low.

Cho & Petrovics 22.

North Korea demonstrates first-strike uncertainty the possibility nuclear weapon survives first strike ambiguity remains regarding North Korea’s ability to strike US cities limited ambiguity appears to bolster deterrence a conventional strike would undermine Pyongyang’s capabilities Pyongyang may raise prospects of striking first even though it unable ambiguity is a feature, not a bug abets North Korea’s deterrent a ambiguous posture should not be confused with brinkmanship strategic ambiguity relies on manipulation of adversaries’ uncertainty

#### The only scenario for a war on the Korean Peninsula is if they give up their arsenal.

Bandow 21

North is continuing to enhance military capabilities the mere possession does not threatens America Pyongyang’s priority is avoiding domination Washington’s willingness to oust governments makes the U S particularly dangerous Pyongyang needs the bomb to protect itself from Washington maintaining military’s loyalty extorting economic benefits nukes have one purpose: deterrence all three Kims prov adept political operators None showed interest in dying atop a radioactive pyre there would be no direct threat to the U S Pyongyang would lack capability

#### They’re incontrovertibly existential.

Yassif et. al 23

catastrophic biological risks could cause severe damage to human civilization jeopardizing its long-term survival caused by a deliberate events involving an engineered pathogen are more likely advancing capabilities are making it easier to engineer sophisticated biological weapons COVID exacerbated vulnerability making bio more attractive as a means to achieve objectives states have financial resources and personnel preventing the use is to make the potential costs unacceptably high and to diminish benefits several states possess programs and more have the latent capability

#### Defense doesn’t assume new tech which overcomes barriers.

Juling 23

new technologies major impact on biological weapons more difficult regulate potentially dangerous technologies user friendly AI applications interpret results gene combinations can be tested develop pathogens specific properties CRISPR provides easier additions of parts of the genome easy to turn bacteria modified viruses transported by synthetic bacteria bringing viruses eradicated back into circulation making bacteria resistant to antibiotics slowly poison people gene drive that automatically spreads through the population biochemistry microreactors can be scaled up complicated facilities no longer necessary future state actors produce agents any place material sciences deliver poison unnoticed targeted transport of viruses nanotubes new possibilities for lethality deliver only the lethal parts nanotechnology already available easier to produce

#### Specifically----they’ll weaponize smallpox.

Carlin 23

possession of anthrax, smallpox, and the plague North Korea could weaponize stocks of phosgene mustard and V-type 12 facilities are believed to be responsible for developing chemical agents

#### That uniquely causes extinction

Myhrvold 13

pathogens have been “weaponized,” Even with advanced treatment, 40% died a pathogen may infect the entire human race a smallpox attack on the United States could easily broaden into a global pandemic epidemic would spread without check vaccine would be insufficient molecular biology made enormous advances, utterly transforming the field Tomorrow’s terrorists will have vastly more deadly bugs Biotech is advancing so rapidly In addition to lethality and drug resistance other parameters can be played with A virus engineered could drive the human race to extinction